Interpreting Easement Agreements
An easement is a right to use land that belongs to someone else. Most of the time, it will “run with the land,” meaning that it will continue on even if ownership of the burdened property changes hands. Frequently, easement language does not on its own settle questions of interpretation, and the document may be silent on important questions about which owners later vigorously disagree. It is thus helpful to understand modern legal principles concerning how courts interpret easement agreements in the event of a dispute.
Easements are generally interpreted like contracts. The ultimate goal of interpretation is usually to ascertain the intent of the original parties. The starting point for doing that is the language of the document itself. Courts refer to this as the “objective manifestation theory of contracts.” Under that approach, courts try to determine the parties’ intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties. We look at the scope of the grant; usually the party who granted the easement limits it to specific purposes (although in some instances, the grant can be so broad that it is the virtual equivalent of ownership, as in the case of some kinds of exclusive easements- see here for more information on exclusive easements: https://beresfordlaw.com/exclusive-easements-in-washington/). Where the scope is limited to one or more specific purposes, courts will ordinarily interpret such language as prohibiting uses which exceed the enumerated allowed uses. Courts impute ordinary and reasonable meanings to the words in a contract, unless the agreement clearly demonstrates a contrary intent. If the plain language is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence will not be considered. For most of Washington State’s history, easements and restrictive covenants were interpreted narrowly so as to allow the owner’s free use of land as much as possible. But several decades ago, the Courts began to relax this rule and allow extrinsic evidence (i.e., facts outside of the document itself) to assist in interpreting ambiguities. However, there are still limitations on the extent to which a court should permit the use of extrinsic evidence.
In a recent unpublished appellate case at Division I of the Court of Appeals, Hagel v. Bui, adjoining neighbors disagreed over the allowed uses of a shared dock that was governed by an easement agreement. The plaintiffs signed the easement agreement with the defendants’ predecessors in 2002. Nearly 20 years later, the parties litigated over whether the easement agreement allowed the defendants to place furniture on the dock, to leave personal property on it, to moor multiple floating devices to it, and to have parties on it. The easement agreement granted an easement for ingress and egress to the dock, stated that “no more than one boat shall be moored on each side of the dock,” and that: “Each party shall use the dock in a reasonably prudent manner consistent with its purposes as a shared recreational amenity to each of the Properties and to prevent harm or unreasonable disturbance to the parties, their guests, and invitees, and to other property owners within [the plat]. . .” The trial court allowed the defendants’ predecessor (who signed the original easement agreement) to offer testimony that the dock was only meant to be limited to getting to and from the moored boats, and that it “wasn’t a party center.” The predecessor witness also testified that his vision was that anything that floats is a boat, and that the dock was not meant for parties, swimming, or setting off fireworks. The trial court accepted this testimony and held that: (1) the parties were limited to attaching to the dock one boat, broadly defined to include any craft that floats, including floating lily pads or mats; (2) each party’s moorage was restricted to the side of the dock lining up with its property; (3) no property could be left on the dock except for the purpose of ingress and egress onto and off of the parties’ boats; (4) fireworks were prohibited; (5) the dock may be used for swimming; (6) each party may have up to seven persons each at a time on the dock at any one time; and (7) the parties’ use of the dock shall be “respectful to the other parties who are using the dock.” The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erroneously relied on the predecessor’s unexpressed subjective intent, and that the easement uses were broader than just ingress and egress. Said the appellate court: “The original contracting parties could have written in similar restrictions related to the use of the dock but instead opted for language allowing mooring of one ‘boat’ on each side of the dock, without restrictive definitional language, ‘reasonably prudent’ use ‘consistent with its purpose as a shared recreational amenity’ and prohibiting ‘unreasonable disturbance.’ These words are plain, unambiguous, and subject to ordinary and reasonable meanings, not the unexpressed subjective intent of [the predecessor].” The appellate court also noted that the post-agreement conduct of the parties was relevant to determine intent; in this case, the defendants tried to impose new restrictions not enumerated in the agreement, after decades of uneventful shared use, and which use included the activities which the defendants complained about.
The Hagel case is a good illustration of how the rules surrounding interpretation of easement agreements can play out in court.
The lawyers at Beresford Booth have a wealth of experience assisting with easement drafting and disputes. If you need assistance in drafting an easement, or if you are involved in an easement dispute, we are here to help. Please contact Beresford Booth at info@beresfordlaw.com or by phone at (425) 776-4100.
