New Washington Opinion May Expand Lis Pendens Rights
A lis pendens is a document that clouds title to real property and provides notice to potential purchasers and encumbrancers that title to the real property is the subject of pending litigation. Washington law only authorizes a party to record a lis pendens in “an action affecting title to real property.” RCW 4.28.320. What constitutes “an action affecting title to real property” is a question that parties often argue over in lawsuits that involve real property. A new decision from Division II of the Washington Court of Appeals, Parman v. Estate of Parman, No. 60735-2-II (Ct. App. July 14, 2026) (“Parman II”), may significantly expand the right of a party to record a lis pendens.
Prior to Division II’s recent opinion in Parman II, Washington courts have attempted to place boundaries on what is, and what is not, “an action affecting title to real property.” Case law dating back decades stands for the proposition that an action seeking monetary damages does not support a lis pendens. See, e.g., Bramall v. Wales, 29 Wn. App. 390, 395, 628 P.2d 511 (1981) (“A lis pendens is not proper where it is filed in anticipation of recovering a money judgment”). More recent case law stands for the proposition that a lis pendens is proper “in an action involving adjudication of rights incident to title to real property.” 134th St. Lofts, LLC v. iCap Nw. Opportunity Fund, LLC, 15 Wn. App. 2d 549, 558, 479 P.3d 367 (2020). Washington courts have observed that, according to Arizona law, “a lawsuit affects a right incident to title if any judgment would expand, restrict, or burden a property owner’s rights bestowed by virtue of that title.” Id.
Without definitive guidance on what claims fit the mold, parties have attempted to test the boundaries. The plaintiff in Parman II did just that. While the facts are convoluted, below is a relevant summary.
Elizabeth Parman purchased real property in 1997. She and her husband later quitclaimed the property to Ruth and Robert Parman, who paid nothing for the property. Elizabeth, her husband, and their children lived in the main portion of the house on the property, while Robert and Ruth lived in an in-law apartment. When Robert passed away, he left the property to Ruth, who assured Elizabeth that she and her husband would inherit the property. Elizabeth proceeded to spend $143,000 on the property, with the goal of developing a horse farm. After Elizabeth and her husband divorced, Ruth revoked her will and left the property solely to Elizabeth’s ex-husband.
Elizabeth filed a lawsuit, alleging unjust enrichment. She requested a judgment for the value of all expenditures and contributions she made in connection with the property. After filing the lawsuit, Elizabeth recorded a lis pendens. The trial court denied the defendants’ first motion to cancel the lis pendens, reasoning that an equitable lien creates a right to a lis pendens. On remand following an initial appeal, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to cancel the lis pendens, holding that Elizabeth’s unjust enrichment action was not “an action affecting title to real property.”
In Parman II, Division II analyzed whether Elizabeth’s unjust enrichment claim, which allegedly created an equitable lien on the property, supported a lis pendens. The court observed that an unjust enrichment claim “is the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained absent any contractual relationship because notions of fairness and justice require it.” The court also observed that an equitable lien “is the right to have property subjected in a court of equity to the payment of a claim.” The court went on to observe that a plaintiff alleging unjust enrichment may obtain an equitable lien on a property if they demonstrate a transactional nexus between the unjust enrichment that is the basis of liability and the specific property in which the claimant asserts remedial rights.
Although an equitable lien does not exist until it is imposed by a written judgment or decree of a trial court, Division II concluded that Elizabeth’s unjust enrichment claim supported Elizabeth’s lis pendens. The court reasoned that if Elizabeth prevailed on her unjust enrichment claim and the trial court imposed an equitable lien on the property, Elizabeth would have the right to force a judicial sale in the event the defendants failed to satisfy the debt. Notably, the court rejected the argument that permitting Elizabeth to impose a lis pendens on the property would circumvent Washington’s prejudgment writ of attachment statute. According to the court, “[a]n unjust enrichment claim that has a sufficient transactional nexus to a property may qualify for an equitable lien which can support a lis pendens.” In other words, because Elizabeth’s potential monetary judgment could potentially be enforced through an equitable lien and forced sale of the property, Elizabeth had the right to record a lis pendens against the property.
The limits of Division II’s decision in Parman II will likely be tested in future litigation. Some litigants may take the position that if the case has some conceivable nexus to real property, Parman II supports a lis pendens where a party is seeking a monetary judgment and the potential money judgment can be executed against real property. Others will likely take the position that Parman II is inconsistent with the purpose of Washington’s lis pendens statute, allows parties to circumvent a prejudgment writ of attachment, and therefore should be overturned. A possible middle ground approach is that Parman II’s holding is narrow and limited to the facts of the case.
If you have an issue involving real property where a lis pendens has been or may be recorded, the lawyers at Beresford Booth are well equipped to evaluate your situation. Please do not hesitate to contact Beresford Booth at info@beresfordlaw.com or by phone at (425) 776-4100.